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I would like to talk wth you about specialty medi-cine and the contemporary thoracic surgeon. I
shall briefly trace the development of specialty
medicine, of which thoracic surgery is a leading
example, describe the challenges to the authority of
the specialist, and finally suggest some responses
called for in this new, rapidly changing, and embat-
tled era. I believe that an assault on the specialist is
adding to the burdens of the modern surgeon and
calls for a response affirming what we stand for.
Development of specialty medicine
The history of specialization in medicine began in
the 1920s and 1930s, when a few doctors were able
to limit their practices to a single disease, a single
organ system, or region of the body. These physi-
cians, who lived in New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
and a few other large Eastern cities, were able to
restrict their practices because of the increasing
urbanization of America, improvements in transpor-
tation, and some emerging technologies that differ-
entiated the specialist from the general physician.
For example, electrocardiography distinguished the
heart specialist from the general practitioner.1
Dr. Paul Samson exemplified early specialization
in surgery. Thoracic surgery was in its infancy when
Samson completed his training in chest surgery in
1935 under John Alexander in Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan. Samson moved to Oakland, California, and was
one of perhaps only 20 or 25 surgeons in the United
States limiting their practices to chest surgery. His
practice consisted of thoracoplasties, bronchosco-
pies, phrenic nerve crushes, and drainage of empy-
emas in patients scattered among the tuberculosis
sanatoriums of Northern California. In 1941, he
took his surgical skills to the North African and
European theaters of war, operating in primitive
facilities near the front lines in what later became
known as “MASH units.” He collaborated with
Lyman Brewer and others in a book entitled For-
ward Surgery of the Severely Injured, in which an
experience of treating more than 10,000 battle ca-
sualties was described.2 It was after World War II,
when Paul Samson and many others returned to
civilian practice, that medical specialization began
to flourish.
The reasons for the tremendous growth of spe-
cialty medicine in this country are both simple and
complex. On the one hand, an ever-expanding
knowledge base in medicine compelled mastery of
Read at the Twenty-third Annual Meeting of The Western
Thoracic Surgical Association, Napa, Calif., June 25-28, 1997.
Received for publication August 4, 1997; accepted for publication
August 8, 1997.
Address for reprints: Daniel J. Ullyot, MD, 1828 El Camino Real,
Suite 802, Burlingame, CA 94010.
J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 1998;115:273-80
Copyright © 1998 by Mosby, Inc.
0022-5223/98 $5.00 1 0 12/6/85375
2 7 3
the special tools and skills, as it has in every orga-
nized activity in our culture, from athletic teams to
manufacturing to higher education. At another
level, complex social, political, and economic forces
combined to produce medical specialization, a phe-
nomenon that became much more pronounced in
this country than in other developed nations.
The experience of World War II led to huge
government expenditures in medical research and in
the education of experts who could apply the new
scientific discoveries to the care of patients. Science
had played a major role in winning the war, and
President Roosevelt, perhaps because of his own
medical history, believed that science, particularly
medical science, could, with government support,
bring great benefits to the American public in peace
time.3
An analogy was made to the Manhattan Project.
A war against disease could be won with sufficient
government funding. This military metaphor was
accepted by the American people and their political
leaders. The idea of conquering disease became all
the more believable with the advent of antibiotics,
which dramatically reduced the incidence of rheu-
matic heart disease, cured endocarditis, and abol-
ished the tuberculosis hospitals. The notion of con-
quest was reinforced by the Salk polio vaccine,
introduced in the mid 1950s, which virtually elimi-
nated infantile paralysis, iron lungs, and hospitals
dedicated to the care of affected patients. Success in
treating infectious disease with the new antibiotics
led to an increasing concern about chronic diseases
such as stroke, cancer, and heart disease.
Time constraints do not allow me to fully describe
the building of the health care system that became
the envy of the world. The federal government
committed vast resources to medical research, edu-
cation, and delivery of medical care. Annual support
for biomedical research increased 1000 times, from
$3 million to $3 billion, between 1940 and 1975. The
emphasis was on research, the research-oriented
medical center, and the training of specialists who
would pursue research during training and then
apply the new scientific discoveries to the care of
patients. The Hill-Burton legislation, enacted in
1946, provided for the construction and moderniza-
tion of nearly 7000 hospitals in more than 4000
communities throughout the nation.
Tax breaks were given to employers to provide
health care benefits for their employees, creating a
private system of health insurance, a uniquely
American system that today pays for approximately
50% of health care. In the mid 1960s, Medicaid and
Medicare programs were enacted to provide health
care for poor and elderly persons, many of whom
had previously been treated as charity patients. The
Medicare and Medicaid programs also funded post-
graduate medical education, the education of med-
ical and surgical specialists. Today the federal gov-
ernment spends, in 1993 dollars, an average of
$70,000 annually on each resident or fellow in
training beyond medical school.4
Responding to a concern about a perceived short-
age of doctors, new medical schools were built and
existing schools were expanded. This resulted in a
further increase in the number of physicians. A vast
cadre of medical and surgical specialists was pro-
duced. Before World War II, 75% of doctors in
active practice identified themselves as general prac-
titioners or part-time specialists. By 1966, 69%
reported themselves as full-time specialists. This is
in marked contrast to the number of specialists in
other industrialized countries, where they account
for only about one third of practicing physicians.
Most dramatic was the growth in surgical specialists,
from 10% of the profession in 1931 to more than
30% by 1969.3
The specialty of thoracic surgery, initially a part of
general surgery, continued to evolve. It acquired its
own residency programs, its own certifying board,
and a residency review committee that establishes
standards and guidelines for thoracic surgical train-
ing and education.
American industry contributed importantly to the
building of the health care infrastructure. The phar-
maceutical industry and medical device manufactur-
ers became world leaders in the development of
health care products.
This so-called “Golden Era” of American medi-
cine, dominated and led by medical and surgical
specialists, recorded a brilliant series of achieve-
ments. Not the least of these was a decrease in the
death rate from cardiovascular disease by 55% from
1950 to 1990. Moreover, it has been shown that
medical and surgical treatments, rather than diet or
preventive measures, account for about 70% of this
decline in mortality rate.5, 6
The assault on specialty medicine
Ironically, despite this outstanding record of ac-
complishment, questions arose about our health
care delivery system. These questions challenged
our emphasis on technologically complex care and
the dominant role of the specialist.
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In the early 1970s, one began to hear about a
“crisis” in health care.7 “Skyrocketing” costs threat-
ened to price medical care out of the reach of many
Americans. On assuming office, the Nixon adminis-
tration was confronted with the rapidly escalating
costs of Medicare and Medicaid. Business interests
complained that employee health benefits were
making American products less competitive in world
markets.
Government support for building the health care
infrastructure had been given as a commitment to
fund without meddling, to leave the details to the
experts. And the experts, the leaders of medicine,
were committed to scientific discovery and the ap-
plication of the new knowledge to the care of
patients by well-trained medical and surgical spe-
cialists. There was little emphasis on the costs of
care as part of the medical school curriculum.
Doctors and patients were insulated from the eco-
nomic consequences of their decisions. And cost was
the problem, with health care expenditures rising at
two to three times the consumer price index.
Medical economists agree that technology is the
predominant driver of medical costs.8 The key to
cost containment apparently lay in limiting access to
expensive medical technology. In its simplest terms,
less care, and especially less care of the expensive,
high-technology variety by specialists, was seen as
the key to constraining health care costs.
Concern about escalating costs of medical care
led to questions about other deficiencies in the
system. It was asserted that the health of Americans
did not compare favorably with that of other coun-
tries. Magazine articles discussing the health “crisis”
pointed out that Americans had higher infant mor-
tality rates and lower life expectancies than did most
Europeans, despite the fact that our per capita
spending on health care was the highest in the
world.7 The implication was that our much-envied,
sophisticated, expensive, specialist-dominated care
did not produce any better health outcomes than did
other, simpler, less-expensive health care delivery
systms.
The so-called “Small Area Variation” studies of
Wennberg and colleagues9 pointed out unexplained
variations in the use of procedures. For example,
they showed that coronary bypass grafting was twice
as likely to be performed per unit population in New
Haven as in Boston. These studies suggested that if
the experts cannot agree on the proper use of
technology, then perhaps they do not know either.
These unexplained variations in clinical practice
raised questions about appropriate use of technol-
ogy and, more importantly, about the authority of
specialists.
Access to care, particularly among the urban poor
and in rural areas, was deficient, suggesting a mald-
istribution of medical manpower in a system that
had grown helter-skelter, without any systematic
organization. There was increasing support for na-
tional health insurance, led by organized labor and
liberal Democrats and opposed by the American
Medical Association and the hospital and insurance
industries.
Fig. 1. Medicare physician reimbursement redistribution vocabulary. OBRA, Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act; HCFA, Health Care Financing Administration.
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The Health Security Act of 1993 (Clinton’s health
plan) promised a solution to the perceived health
care crisis. The plan featured a central role for the
primary care physician. According to the plan’s
authors, this physician would provide preventive
care, less-expensive but equally effective care for
common conditions, and, acting as “gatekeeper,” a
barrier to patient access to speciality care.
The theme of less-expensive, less-sophisticated
care given by family doctors, helping to prevent
illness rather than treating people only when they
are sick, was a powerful image. One heard about
“caring and cognitive” physicians, in contradistinc-
tion to the specialist-technician-proceduralist. If the
specialist could be demonized as not caring, not
thoughtful, not interested in prevention, interested
only in applying, often inappropriately, technology
that was poorly understood and sometimes frighten-
ing to the public, it would become easier to restrict
access to specialty care and mitigate the “skyrock-
eting” costs of care.
The Clinton health plan was perceived as overly
bureaucratic and was rejected by the 103rd Con-
gress. However, the idea of building health care
delivery systems in which the primary care physician
is given incentives to limit access to specialists
became well accepted within managed care plans.
Not surprisingly, reimbursement for specialty care
became a target. By dividing the house of medicine
into primary and specialty care and promising pri-
mary care physicians a windfall increase in reim-
bursement, it became politically possible for Medi-
care payments to specialists to be sharply reduced.
The relative value process, with a pretense of scien-
tific methodology, succeeded in lowering reimburse-
ment for procedural services relative to evaluation
and management services. Several surgical proce-
dures, among them cataract extraction, hip replace-
ment, and coronary artery bypass grafting, were
arbitrarily termed “overpriced procedures” under
an assertion of “inherent reasonableness” and were
reimbursed at lower rates according to an acceler-
ated time table. The terminology used to justify
payment reductions to specialists would cause even
the most ardent central economic planner to blush
(Fig. 1).
More recently, the opportunity to again decrease
Medicare physician reimbursement, by attacking the
practice expense component of the resource-based
relative value scale formula, promises to diminish
the specialist’s income even further. The methodol-
ogy used to estimate practice expenses, a method-
ology that cannot be scientifically defended, favors
office-based versus hospital-based practice. It is yet
another turn of the screw in redistributing physician
income away from the specialist. The total payments
to thoracic surgeons for coronary artery bypass
grafting in Medicare patients is projected to be cut
by as much as 44% by lowering the practice expense
component alone.
Reimbursement issues are difficult to counter,
especially in a profession whose dominant ethic is
beneficence, placing the patient’s interests above all
other interests, and especially above the financial
interests of the doctor. Nonetheless, there comes a
point when declining reimbursement does affect
Fig. 2. Advertisement for minimally invasive heart surgery by the Columbia HCA Hospitals in the
Nashville, Tennessee, region.
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access to care and the ability to attract high-quality
people to careers that demand long years of prepa-
ration and commitment. This strategy of restricting
the supply of specialists and access to specialty care
might be termed “rationing behind the veil.” If one
reduces incentives to provide service, less service
will be provided, and less money will be spent,
without overt rationing of care.
The modern surgeon
This assault on the specialist places an additional
burden on the contemporary thoracic surgeon. It is
no longer enough to provide excellent surgical care
for our patients, although this remains our highest
responsibility. I want to be clear about that. The care
of patients, one patient at a time, is what matters
most and will continue to be the bedrock of our
professionalism and of our professional satisfaction.
Beyond this, however, we must assume a leadership
role during this time of change and restructuring of
our health care system. I believe that thoracic
surgeons can exert a positive influence in shaping
the future and are perhaps uniquely qualified to
make the case for specialty medicine.
What is the case to be made? Simply stated,
specialty medicine works, and care by experts is
more effective and more efficient. As such, it has the
potential to save money and add value. All medical
progress since World War II has come from special-
ists. Americans have voted with their feet for speci-
ality care. The rationing of expert care by turning
back to a nostalgic past is not the direction we
should be heading. Who can better make this case
than the thoracic surgeon, whose activities are
highly visible, whose outcomes are easily measured,
and who work in the vineyards of heart disease and
other life-threatening conditions that touch the lives
of so many Americans?
I see two areas where we can have a positive
influence. One is in the discussion of technology; the
other is in the discussion of quality.
Technology
Americans are fascinated, awed, and sometimes
frightened by medical technology. I am talking now
about technology in its broadest sense, including
procedures, devices, pharmaceuticals, and orga-
nized systems of care. We need to explain our
technology more clearly to our patients and to the
public. We, who are to a great extent defined by
technology, should be leaders in explaining the
safety, effectiveness, and appropriate applications of
our technology. In this era, when business ethics are
replacing professional ethics in health care and
Fig. 3. Hospital observed, expected, and risk-adjusted mortality rates. Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery in
New York State, 1992 to 1994, New York State Department of Health, Albany, NY 12220.
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powerful economic interests in the hospital, device,
and pharmaceutical industries are marketing di-
rectly to the public, we have a responsibility to lead
and to educate. The commercial interests cannot be
allowed to get out in front, creating public expecta-
tions that we may not be able to fulfill.
For purposes of illustration, consider a tape
played for a wide radio audience in the Nashville,
Tennessee, region, touting minimally invasive heart
surgery by the Columbia HCA Hospitals (Fig. 2).
Whatever one might think of the potential of mini-
mally invasive approaches in thoracic surgery, this
blatant advertisement, overstating evolving surgical
technology and scaring people about existing and
well-proven technology, is a challenge to our pro-
fessionalism.
Another area where we need to speak up is in the
application of expensive technology in end-of-life
situations. The public fears the specter of dying a
protracted, dehumanizing, expensive death in the
hospital because of the mindless application of
complex technology. We must convince the public
that there is consensus among experts, that we are
capable of writing practice guidelines that are based
on the best available scientific data, that we are
sensitive to the transition from critical to terminal
illness, and that we respect patient autonomy.
Finally, we need to offer a more “cognitive”
service to our medical colleagues. They must come
to understand that a surgical consultation offers the
patient more than simple agreement to do the
procedure, and that the appropriate application of
technology begins early in the clinical encounter.
The decision to perform cardiac catheterization, for
example, may engender expectations in the patient
or the patient’s family, expectations that make de-
cisions not to perform a revascularization or other
procedure difficult even when such a procedure was
not appropriate from the very beginning. We need
to educate our colleagues, as well as our patients
and the public, about the interconnectedness of care
and to work toward systems of health care delivery
that integrate competing technologies for our pa-
tients.
Quality
The public discussion of health care reform is
beginning to shift from cost containment to quality
of care. It is here that we have the best chance to
make our case. Legislative proposals to limit gag
clauses in managed care contracts with physicians,
to disclose financial incentives that restrict access to
specialty services, and to forbid premature hospital
discharges (as in drive-by deliveries and drive-by
Fig. 4. Annual postoperative length of stay summary. First-operation elective coronary artery bypass (n 5
355,219). CI, Confidence interval. *1996 data are for first half of year only; patients with missing dates
censored.
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mastectomies) are evidence for the increasing con-
cern about quality. We need to add our voices
linking quality with access to specialty care.
We have seen a number of studies showing the
superiority of outcomes in the management of myo-
cardial infarction by cardiologists versus general
internists and primary care physicians.10-12 A similar
story can be told, for example, in pulmonary resec-
tion by thoracic surgeons compared with that by
surgeons without formal thoracic surgical training.
Such data have been published,13 and more are
forthcoming.
Obviously, the word quality means different things
to different people. There is no agreement on the
definition, and the measurement of quality varies
considerably according to whether one is talking
about health plans, hospital care, or physician per-
formance.
Thoracic surgeons have the most advanced data
bases for measuring outcomes for specific inter-
ventions of any of the medical or surgical special-
ties. Perhaps the best example is the Society of
Thoracic Surgeons database, with its risk-strati-
fied mortality algorithms for coronary artery by-
pass grafting. It is a credit to our specialty that we
have led the way from the reporting of raw
mortality data to a reporting system that gives a
much more accurate picture of surgical perfor-
mance. It is also to our credit that we have
achieved a high degree of voluntary participation
in our databases. If these information systems are
well conceived, properly audited, and explained to
the public with the proper caveats, we should
welcome public disclosure of our results.
It is necessary that we provide leadership in the
definition of quality, because an enormous
amount of information is being collected about
our activities from administrative databases, bill-
ing records, and the like, data that are worthless at
best and misleading at worst. The editor of the
New England Journal of Medicine, Jerome Kas-
sirer, puts it well14:
From a system that until recently was dominated by
reliance on intelligent and thoughtful decision mak-
ing by individual doctors, we seem to have embarked
on a path of codifying the practice of medicine. In
part we are doing so in the name of quality. To be
sure, we are developing the tools to measure and
monitor quality, but before we embrace them we
must be sure that they are equal to their intended
tasks and that the benefits of standardization are
worth the costs.
We must be faithful to our scientific training and
insist that when we say we are measuring quality we
are in fact doing so.
Risk-stratified operative mortality rates in cor-
onary artery bypass grafting are useful and legit-
imate measurements of effectiveness. There is
danger, however, if a single number is accepted as
a surrogate for quality in the broad range of
services provided by thoracic surgeons. If the
many facets of surgical excellence, such as the use
of arterial conduits, the ability to reconstruct
rather than replace valves, the management of
complex aortic dissections, and the whole range
of ethical and interpersonal qualities we bring to
the care of our individual patients, are assumed to
be represented by a single number, our service
may be misrepresented by overly broad interpre-
tation.
There is another danger. In the New York
experience, very few surgeons or institutions are
statistically different; most are neither better nor
worse than the state average for risk-adjusted
mortality rates for coronary artery bypass grafting
(Fig. 3).15 If this example of “report card medi-
cine” helps to homogenize surgeons and pro-
grams, so that payors can claim that quality is
assured and then choose entirely on price, the
public will not be well served.
Although we embrace good reporting systems and
strive to improve measurements of quality, we must,
as Kassirer14 says, make sure that the databases,
practice guidelines, and other attempts to codify are
properly understood and properly applied.
Conclusion
Yes, there is an assault on specialty medicine. To
the extent that the criticisms are valid, we should be
agents of change. Thoracic surgeons have led efforts
to lower costs. Same-day surgery, early extubation,
and movement of patients along accelerated clinical
pathways have lowered costs by reducing lengths of
hospital stay (Fig. 4).16
George Will,17 in an op-ed piece in the Washing-
ton Post, calls the plan to contain medical costs by
decreasing the number of specialists a “Medieval
Cap on Doctors.” In this piece he quotes Walter
Reich:
“The idea that one should avert the expense of medical
procedures by getting rid of the specialists who under-
stand or carry them out, or by making sure that new
specialists aren’t trained . . . [is] a deliberate dumbing
down of medicine.”
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We have much to offer our patients as thoracic
surgeons. We were all convinced early in our careers
of the value of specialty medicine by the experience
of making a difference in the lives of our patients.
We now must make sure that our voices are heard in
defense of specialty medicine and of direct access
for our patients to the benefits of modern, scientific
care by experts.
R E F E R E N C E S
1. Fye WB. Introduction. In: American cardiology. 1st
ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1996. p.
6-12.
2. Stiles QR. Paul Samson: the first twenty years. 1st ed. Manches-
ter [MA]: Western Thoracic Surgical Association; 1995.
3. Starr P. The liberal years. In: The social transformation
of American medicine. 1st ed. New York: Basic Books; 1982.
4. Congressional Budget Office. Medicare and graduate medi-
cal education. Washington, DC: US Government Printing
Office; 1995.
5. Altman LK. Heart disease progress linked to treatments.
New York Times 1997 Feb 19.
6. Hunink MGM, Goldman L, Tosteson ANA, Miattleman
MA, Goldman PA, Williams LW, et al. The recent decline in
mortality from coronary heart disease, 1980-1990. JAMA
1997;277:5535-42.
7. Starr P. End of a mandate. In: The social transformation
of American medicine. 1st ed. New York: Basic Books;
1982.
8. Newhouse JP. An iconoclastic view of health cost contain-
ment. Health Aff 1993;12(suppl):152-71.
9. Wennberg JE, Freeman JL, Culp WJ. Are hospital services
rationed in New Haven or over-utilised in Boston? Lancet
1987;1:1185-9.
10. Jollis JG, DeLong ER, Peterson ED, Muhlbaier LH, Fortin
DF, Califf RM, et al. Outcome of acute myocardial infarction
according to the specialty of the admitting physician. N Engl
J Med 1996;335:1880-7.
11. Nash IS, Nash DB, Fuster V. Do cardiologists do it better?
J Am Coll Cardiol 1997;29:475-8.
12. Health Care Cost Containment Council. Focus on heart
attack in central and northeastern Pennsylvania. Harrisburg:
Health Care Cost Containment Council; 1997. p. iv.
13. Benfield JR. Metamorphosis. Ann Thorac Surg 1996;61:
1045-50.
14. Kassirer JP. The quality of care and the quality of measuring
it. N Engl J Med 1993;329:1263-5.
15. New York State Department of Health. Coronary Artery
Bypass Surgery in New York State, 1992-94. Albany: New
York State Department of Health; 1994. p. 8.
16. Data analyses of the Society of Thoracic Surgeons national
cardiac database: the sixth year—January 1997. Chicago: The
Society of Thoracic Surgeons; 1997.
17. Will GF. “Medieval” cap on doctors. Washington Post 1994
Nov 17; Sect. A:23
The Journal of Thoracic and
Cardiovascular Surgery
February 1998
2 8 0 Ullyot
